Abstract
§ 1. The notorious Lucius Veratius [11] Over the centuries, the case of Lucius Veratius has been the subject of some debate among lawyers. 1 The law of the Twelve Tables provided that the private penalty for causing injury to a person was 25 as. The cruel and abundantly rich Lucius Veratius derived much pleasure from going out into the streets, followed by his slave who carried a money purse, and indiscriminately hitting innocent passers-by. Lucius would instantly compensate his victims, thus fully complying with his legal duties. Is this the way tort law should work? The case of Lucius Veranus poses pertinent questions and unsurprisingly lawyers through the centuries have asked themselves whether this outcome was fair and just, whether tort law should be considered merely as a tariff or tax on wrongful behaviour instead of a set of rules with preventive aspirations that provides for some remedy that would actually help to prevent or stop the likes of Lucius in their hitting sprees.
Obviously, from a perspective of prevention one could ask oneself whether the ex post penalty in tort for deliberate wrongdoing of Lucius should not be set at a punitive level to completely eradicate such wrongdoing. However, there is also an alternative line of enquiry which I set out to investigate in this paper: the role of injunctive relief in tort law. Designing mechanisms for injunctive relief in cases concerning deliberate torts was as daunting to the Romans as considering an overarching conception of injunctive relief in tort is to modern European legal systems. In order to better understand why such an overarching conception is still lacking, this article sets out to survey the French, German and English legal systems with respect to the role of injunction in tort law. With the comparative analysis thus retained it may be possible to analyse the role of injunction in a particular set of cases, namely cases concerning wrongful risk-taking behaviour. This set may be apt to uncover force fields underlying tort and injunction. Take for instance an employer negligently in breach of an uncodified duty of care vis-à-vis his employees to refrain from exposing them to certain risks. Does such a breach warrant injunctive relief petitioned for by the employees? And if so, under which conditions? And if not, what does that tell us about the nature of duties of care in tort?
Admittedly, there seems to be little practical experience with injunctive relief in the set of cases I set out to investigate. Nevertheless, the implications of allowing or rejecting such claims are formidable. By granting petitions for injunctive relief, courts effectively convert ex post claims for compensation into primary duties to act or omit. By contrast, rejecting injunctive relief renders tort law rules into mere taxes on wrongful behaviour. Which of these two routes is chosen by courts and legislators and how forceful are the arguments used to support either choice? Drawing on the comparative analysis, I will attempt to identify the implications of sustaining and disallowing injunctive relief for [12] the understanding of tort law. If, indeed, allowing or rejecting claims for injunctive relief sheds light on tort law's ends, perhaps a threefold conception of tort law is in order.
As concerns the scope of this paper, it is understood that by no means does it present an overarching concept as referred to earlier. Moreover, four important complications are left untreated. First, no specific attention is devoted to the relationship in civil procedure between the summary procedure and main proceedings. Secondly, issues of convergence and coordination with other sources of law, notably regulatory law and criminal law, remain largely uncovered. Thirdly, issues of collective claims for injunction such as group litigation or collective litigation by interest groups and associations are excluded unless relevant for the subject of wrongful risk-taking. Fourthly, no attention is paid to the method of enforcement of In a recent book discussing the Israeli Draft Civil Code, Austrian law professor Helmut Koziol discusses Section 366 of the Israeli Draft, which reads: 'Tort liability is liability for damage caused by wrongful conduct or liability for the conduct itself.' Koziol is puzzled by the wording of this Section and he wonders how a person can be liable without having caused damage.
2 He continues to argue that the Draft does not fit either the Israeli concept of tort law, or the continental European way of thinking, because:
(…) it is almost generally accepted that the primary aim of tort law is the compensation of loss suffered by the victim. As far as I am aware, the widespread opinion is that injunctions are not a subject of tort law and that they need fewer requirements than claims for compensation.
Koziol's remark raises a number of interesting questions. Firstly, is the issue of injunction indeed not considered to be part of tort law, as Koziol suggests? And if so, what are they considered to be part of? Secondly, does it really matter for the relationship between tort law and injunction whether injunctive relief is in fact a part of tort law, or whatever part of the law? One could also pose the question whether injunctions in tort should ideally be considered to also be part and parcel of tort law.
[13] It is not difficult to appreciate Koziol's puzzlement, both from a common law and civil law perspective. Most legal systems in one way or another distinguish between the law of torts and damages as substantive law on the one hand and injunction, declaratory judgement, penalty payment and contempt of court (where applicable) as issues of procedural law on the other. From a conceptual point of view, however, the connecting points between substantive law and procedural law are obvious. One cannot obtain a judgment declaring that the defendant has acted wrongfully if there was actually no wrongful act from a substantive legal point of view. Further, prohibiting someone from acting wrongfully in the future is logically inconceivable, without first ascertaining wrongfulness of that (future) behaviour. That is, unless the law develops different categories of wrongfulness depending on the remedy sought, for example, by distinguishing between categories of wrongful acts which are actionable per se and those that only give rise to a cause of action if damage is proven,or if it links injunctive relief to something else than wrongful behaviour.
Hence, it is theoretically conceivable to consider prohibitory injunction as a totally separate response to infringement of property rights, which would link injunctive relief as a procedural sequel to ownership (actio negatoria, rei vindicatio) and would leave issues of wrongfulness untreated. Comparably, injunctive relief for nuisance and slanderous communications could be construed as a form of relief for specific categories of tort, unavailable for other categories. These are undoubtedly practical ways to climb out of the labyrinth, but rather than climbing our way out, it seems more fruitful to consider how the labyrinth was built by taking a closer look from the inside.
b. English law
The role of injunction under English law can only properly be understood against the historical background of two divisions in the common law: on the one hand the division between torts actionable per se and torts actionable upon damage, and, on the other, the division between law and equity.
The first division concerns two distinct categories of tort. Traditionally, certain categories of torts (torts actionable on proof of damage) were fundamentally construed as merely giving a right to monetary compensation after the tort had been committed, rather than actual and direct protection against the infringement as such. 3 Essentially, courts [14] at law were not considered to be enforcers of rights and protected interests but rather to be appliers of tariffs for committed wrongs. Other torts, however, were considered to be actionable per se -to be heard by courts of law without the need for evidence of damage.
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This category includes such torts as trespass and defamation. These causes of action were held to provide legal protection to 'interests considered fundamental to English society and the rule of law such as property, liberty and reputation'.
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The second division concerns the distinction between law and equity. Here, an analogy between common law and Roman law can be made. In classical Roman law, omnis condamnatio est pecuniaria and only at a later stage did the practice of protecting interests by actually granting injunctive relief through praetorian interdicts develop. 6 Likewise, the common law remedy for torts was pecuniary in form and therefore backward-looking by nature. 7 In England and Wales, a more comprehensive ideal of actual protection against tortious behaviour was developed only in equity by courts with equitable jurisdiction. 8 This protection could take the form of injunctive relief in equity where it would not be granted at law.
Originally, injunctive relief was seen as an ultimum remedium to be administered only in cases where the available remedies at law were perceived as inadequate or inappropriate, for example, if the monetary damage was trivial but (repeated) infringement was nevertheless considered intolerable. position is more balanced; the general test is whether it would be more just to grant an injunction than to award damages.
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That said, two important features from the historical basis of injunctive relief in equity remain. The first feature is that injunction is fundamentally considered to be a [15] discretionary power of the court and not a right of the claimant. 11 In exercising this power, courts pay attention to the practicability of injunction in the given circumstances. This requires the balancing of risks and benefits in the light of the interests involved. 12 Such balancing is especially apparent in case of prohibitory injunction aimed at averting potential wrongful risk-taking such as a quia timet injunction. A qui timet injunction is conditional upon the weighing of factors such as the prospect of grave and irreversible harm, 13 the balancing of the magnitude of the evil against the chances of its occurrence, 14 proof of imminent danger of very substantial damage, 15 as well as previous disregard of the rights of the claimant. 16 Moreover, in judging petitions for injunction, the court will consider the prospect of the court (and parties) being excessively burdened by recurring applications for orders and directions as to the execution of the order. 17 This may lead the court to refuse the injunction or to ensure that the court order and its terms are expressed in as clear and unambiguous language as is reasonably possible. 18 Ideally, the court order focuses on the required outcome rather than the process towards the outcome but depending on circumstances, a step-by-step guidance may have to be given.
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All in all, courts seem to want to avoid excessively intervening in private relationships themselves and having parties immoderately rely on injunctive relief. 20 Clearly, this dilemma requires a subtle weighing-process. A few examples may illustrate the extent to which English courts are willing to allow injunctive relief. In Redland Bricks Ltd. v Morris, the defendant brick company excavated a quarry and as a consequence the [16] neighbour's land subsided onto the defendant's land. 21 It was likely that further damage would occur.
Hence, the wrongful withdrawal of support had already taken place and the question was merely whether the claimant could get a mandatory injunction to prevent further damage. However, it was estimated that preventing further damage would cost as much as 35,000 GBP whereas the potential damage would not exceed 1,600 GBP. A mandatory injunction was therefore denied.
In Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd, the defendant put up houses in breach of a contractual clause against development. However, the value of the surrounding estate had not been reduced by the development. A mandatory restorative injunction was refused, as it was held that demolition of the houses would constitute a waste of much needed housing. 22 Instead, the claimant was awarded an amount in damages equal to what he could reasonably have demanded prior to building, in return for waiving his rights under the clause. 23 In Miller v Jackson, a cricket club allowed balls to land on the claimants' property. An injunction sought on the basis of nuisance and negligence was refused. The public interest in enabling the locals to enjoy outdoor recreation prevailed over the owners' rights to quietly enjoy their properties (notwithstanding the owners' right to compensation). 24 This case seems to give authority to the inclusion of interests wider than those of the litigants in the weighing process. 25 Contrastingly, in Kennaway v Thompson, a prohibitory injunction for nuisance caused by excessive noise from a motor boat racing club was partially granted, notwithstanding the interests of the public involved in the racing activities. 26 This gives some credence to the proposition that, in judging claims for injunctive relief for nuisance, courts engage in a process of weighing the interests involved. 27 The second feature of injunction is that it is primarily considered to be an equitable remedy to support a legal right of a private individual rather than a sanction for wrongful behaviour. Indeed, in most of the cases mentioned earlier, a property right was involved. If there is no legal right involved, the court may be more reticent in granting an injunction. For example, it was held that the owner of a house named 'Ashford House' did not have a legal right to the name and as a result, prohibitory injunction was denied. Equally, the husband of a pregnant woman seeking injunction against her plan to have an abortion [17] was held not to have a legal right ready for protection by injunction. From other case law, however, it seems that the concept of 'legal right' may be less than decisive. For instance, there is ample case law on the protection of obligations of confidentiality through injunction.
essentially because he could not show any particular interest or special damage. 29 Hence, the mere fact that an individual expects to suffer damage by the breach of a statutory duty does not give rise to injunctive relief. However, if an individual claimant can show that the statutory duty was designed to protect a class of which he is a member, then the claimant has standing and injunction may be granted.
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The discretionary nature of the court's powers and the requirement of a legal right do not preclude, however, the procedure for injunction leaving its mark, or even moulding rights and duties under substantive law. In fact, it is sometimes said that English law is becoming more rights-based, making the vindicatory function of remedies increasingly [18] relevant. 31 If true, this development may also herald a shift towards a more rights-based approach in injunction for negligent wrongdoing. Currently, however, this seems to be truer for contract law than for tort law. In the general area of negligence, there is still the dominant view that tortious liability in the tort of negligence is founded on the consequences of the act rather than on the act itself and that there is no free standing duty of care in negligence. 32 It still seems to be conventional wisdom that there is only significance in the primary duty preceding the secondary obligation to compensate, if breach of the duty per se is actionable -as is the case with torts actionable per se. 33 That said, statutory duties designed to protect specific interests do seem to be free standing and hence enforceable through injunction. This might indicate an increasing convergence of legal rights actionable per se and 'legal interests' traditionally not considered to be so.
c. French law
The French law of torts centres around the unitary concept of responsabilité pour faute. The concept of faute encapsulates both the wrongful act and mputability (l'illicéité et imputabilité) -although the French themselves would not spontaneously dissect their concept of faute into such elements. 34 Indeed, it is precisely this lack of dissection that makes it difficult for French law to dovetail tort law with injunction. Article 1832 Code Civil (CC) is explicitly geared towards compensation and does not impose a direct prohibition of committing torts.
This did not stop Planiol from theorizing that liability under Article 1382 presupposes a primary obligation to act or to refrain from acting and that liability is in fact the secondary, rather than the primary obligation. In the Avant-Projet Catala, however, the emphasis is put slightly differently. First, the Catala project considers injunctive relief to be a discretionary power of the court in tort cases rather than a logical stepping stone between illicéité and faute. Secondly, the Catala project works from the principle that prevention of damage is not a specific function of liability under tort law 44 and that injunction, that is, reparation in kind, may be a subsidiary measure rather than a right of the claimant. 45 The Catala project provides: Note that in the golf course cases the courts allowed injunction for certain risks, which is different from allowing injunction for uncertain risks. The former seems to be merely an application of a Learned-Hand based approach while the latter would amount to application of the precautionary principle. The German Reichsgericht (1901) first approached the issue of injunction by connecting actions for damages with actions for injunction, by holding that cases that were actionable for damages were also actionable for prohibitory injunction. 55 The Court's reasoning was criticized for failing to distinguish retrospective from prospective remedies, 56 but it did help German doctrine to better express the conditions for injunctive relief subsequently. For instance, the labelling of 'unlawfulness' and 'fault' in the tort provisions of the BGB was subsequently used to compare and distinguish [24] retrospective and prospective remedies. 'Unlawfulness' of behaviour in view of legally protected interests could thus be considered both retrospectively and prospectively, as in both cases the breach of a duty to respect the legally protected interest was at the heart of the remedy. From this doctrinal reasoning came the conclusion that 'fault' could only be relevant for judging past breaches and not for injunction orders to the extent that these dealt with future breaches.
d. German law
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It was only in 1905 that the Reichsgericht considered the relationship between injunction and enforcement of Rechte and Rechtsgüter (subjective rights and interests protected by statute) by holding that any right and protected interest was worthy of protection by prohibitory injunction. 58 As a result, currently injunctive relief is also granted currently for breach of statutory duties if the statute aims at protecting the interests of the claimant.
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In current German doctrine, the general category Abwehransprüche is subdivided into Unterlassungsklagen (prohibitory injunction aimed at refraining from infringement; § 890 ZPO), quasi-negatorische Beseitigungsklagen (mandatory injunction aimed at either ending infringement or positive restorative action for the application of § 249 BGB, § 887 and 888 ZPO.
60
Legal doctrine has extensively debated the nature of injunctive relief in general. Some scholars consider injunctive relief merely a procedural phenomenon without conveying any legal rights on the claimant. However, the majority of legal authors argue that 'substantive rights of action or omission' underlie every type of injunctive relief.
The separation of conditions for injunction and compensation has also led to the assertion that a claim for damages in tort is logically dependent on the pre-existence of a duty to act or omit. This is the Planiol argument. 61 claim for compensation has res judicata effect between the litigants in a subsequent procedure for prohibitory injunctive relief. The Bundesgerichtshof reasoned that although the facts underlying the claim for prohibition -past infringement of the rights of the claimant -may be identical to the facts that were earlier deemed insufficient for sustaining a claim for compensation in tort, the acts targeted are different: the claim for compensation relates to past acts whereas the claim for prohibitory injunction concerns future acts. Moreover, the two claims offer different forms of protection and this may bring the defendant to display distinct behaviour in defending either claim. He may be more interested in putting up a defence against one claim than against the other. For these reasons, elements of the claim decided in one procedure have no res judicata effect in the other procedure.
The second case concerned the extinction of claims for injunction. In a 1990, decision the Bundesgerichtshof held that the right to apply for injunctive relief by designated consumer associations under the 1976 General Contract Terms Act was not a procedural remedy sui generis, but a substantive right pursuant to § 194 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. This meant that as such, the right to injunctive relief was considered to be subject to prescription and estoppel.
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It seems that the concept of injunction as the procedural materialization of substantive legal rights to action or omission by the defendant can be traced back to Savigny and Windscheid, who helped to distinguish 19 th century German law from Roman law. Roman law itself did little to distinguish substantive rights from procedural actions. By imbuing German scholarship with the concept of subjective rights, Savigny and Windscheid were seminal in conceptualizing injunctive relief as the procedural side of a genuine right to action or omission. 64 Perhaps this also explains why German law has succeeded better in dovetailing tort law and injunctive relief than English law, as the common law still seems to be in the middle of a process of defining the law of torts as a rights-based system.
The use of injunctive relief in German tort law is twofold: injunction serves to protect subjective rights such as property ('geschützter Rechtspositionen') and to legally enforce arranged duties to behave in a certain way (i.e. statutory duties and uncodified duties of care enforceable under § 823 et seq. BGB). 65 Hence, in theory it can be used to stop wrongful risk-taking from causing harm. In practice, though, there are some obstacles. For prospective injunction, danger of occurrence, or reoccurrence, is relevant. 66 Imminent danger that the wrongful act will occur is usually the yardstick used. 67 In case of danger of reoccurrence, however, a certain reversal of the burden of proof can be [26] applied. Another issue that may be relevant is the precision of the verdict. To the extent that an injunction is aimed at future acts, describing such acts may be difficult as these by nature are more diffuse and hence more difficult to delineate. 68 This brings courts to carefully consider and phrase orders granting a prohibitory injunction and it also indicates that such orders are in inherent need of construction.
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An example drawn from German case law may illustrate the difficulties for courts to consider injunction for wrongful risk-taking. The owner of a house with a garden noticed that his garden drew considerable attention from small children in his neighbourhood. Although he had secured his garden with a fence, children from time to time nevertheless succeeded in entering the garden. Quite a number of these stray children fell in the pond. For this reason, the parents feared that the pond would sooner or later cause some harm to the children of the neighbourhood. The parents petitioned the court on the basis of wrongful risktaking by the pond owner for a mandatory injunction to implement precautions, for example, better fencing. 70 As such, a mandatory injunction is feasible under German law. But how specific may the court be?
May it merely order outcome or is it also allowed to formulate the positive duty and how it should be executed? 71 Admittedly, this is a difficult issue as some legal systems would find a court order that merely describes the outcome as too vague to impose legally enforceable duties.
§ 3. Comparative notes
As Kennett rightly noted, 'enforcement laws are deeply embedded in national histories and cultures, and lie at the intersection of many different areas of substantive law', which make them potentially resistant to comparison (let alone harmonization). 73 So the previous comparative overview was merely a first attempt at comparing different styles of enforcement in tort law. The overall conclusion is that injunctive relief for wrongful risk-taking is underdeveloped in the legal systems reviewed earlier. Whether that is deplorable or not is a matter for later discussion. What is interesting here is that at first sight the legal systems seem to have different levels of rigidity in dealing with injunction [27] as a remedy, both in terms of legal practice and dogmatic structure. As far as practice is concerned, use of civil injunction is predominantly made in competition law, intellectual property law, unfair commercial practices, neighbour law, labour disputes, privacy, anti-social behaviour and domestic violence (occupation and non-molestation orders).
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As far as the differences between legal systems are concerned, it has been said that German courts are less reticent in allowing mandatory injunction than English courts and that the latter show a clear preference for damages. 75 With regard to wrongful risk-taking, examples are scarce in either jurisdiction. If anything , this renders it impossible to draw firm conclusions. As far as rigidity in structure is concerned, it seems that jurisdictions such as the German one, with a dogmatic distinction between wrongfulness and imputability, have an easier job fitting in injunctive relief in their concept of tort law than those that work with unitary concepts such as faute and the tort of negligence that stress the outcome of the act rather than the act itself. 76 On a general level, however, these differences in structure, use and extent of injunction in tort law offer a more profound insight into the role of the judiciary in tort law. As noted by Damaska and Kessler, 77 the organisation of state authority and the prevailing conception of what purposes such authority should serve, in part explain the shape that methods of dispute resolution take in a particular jurisdiction. This is also true for enforcement mechanisms in private law. Take for instance penalty payments available in some jurisdictions (Zwangsgeld, l'astreinte, dwangsom) as an instrument for prodding the defendant to comply with a prohibitory or mandatory injunction: for each day the defendant is in violation of the court-ordered injunction he will forfeit an amount in money. The interesting curiosity here is that in some jurisdictions, the penalty payment flows into the public purse whereas in other jurisdictions it flows into the claimant's purse. It can be argued that these differences between jurisdictions tell us something about the perceived role of judicial authority and the role the judiciary plays in civil disputes. Moreover, it can be maintained that by allowing claimants to collect and keep the penalty payment, the legislature may want to signal to citizens that the judge is not the key player in the procedure and that the function of the judiciary in civil law is more a provider of adjudicatory services to the public rather than the enforcement agent vested with exclusive state powers. In any event, it seems plausible that the shape, form and extent of injunctive relief in a given legal system signals how that legal system perceives [28] litigants, courts, and the relationship between procedural law and substantive private law. This underscores the observation that it would be misleading to separate tort law systems from the procedural environment in which they operate. 78 From this perspective, it may be argued that the stance of the judiciary in petitions for injunction against wrongful risk-taking can reveal something about the core of tort law. We all acknowledge that in practice, tort law provides monetary compensation for wrongs causing harm. That is what it does, but what does it aim at? Why would it want to compensate? One could easily assess that monetary compensation is merely a remedy and as such cannot be considered a goal of tort law. Surely, tort law must be about more than compensating for compensation's sake. Indeed, tort theorists put forward laudable goals behind the remedy of compensation, such as restorative justice, vindication of rights, etc.
In practice, some legal systems explicitly define tort law in terms of a legal institution aimed at protecting specifically identified interests against infringements, such as the German unitary idea of tort. Others work from the central idea that tort law is to protect against wrongful behaviour in general,for example, the French idea of tort. Again other legal systems, such as the common law, hold a middle position by categorising some torts as primarily protection of rights (torts actionable per se) and others as merely giving rise to compensation for damage after the event as is the case with the tort of negligence. To some extent, legal systems adhering to a rights-based approach in tort law (ubi ius, ibi remedium) could be expected to approach the foundations of injunctive relief differently from legal systems historically based on a semiclosed list of writs and remedies. The former could be expected to consider injunctive relief to be one of the claimant's remedies defining his substantive right to action or omission, whereas the latter could be expected to consider injunctive relief to be a court prerogative based on autonomous criteria which may or may not coincide with one or more of the conditions for liability in tort. Hence, the rights-based approach will by necessity look for foundation of the injunction in the substantive right. In this approach, the injunction is a remedy in tort and as such cannot go beyond the scope of the right. In other words:
The close link between right and remedy lies in the fact that a right must necessarily give rise to a remedy which allows the right to be enforced through the judicial process, which actually means that the "constitutive" conditions of the remedy should be the same as the "substantive law" conditions for the underlying right to arise.
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[29] Typically, the remedy cannot go beyond what the right necessitates, nor should it provide less than what the right requires. An example drawn from Dutch law may illustrate this point. A listed building was ruined by fire. The owner of the scorched building decided to tear it down and to remove the remains, which was in contravention with applicable regulations. A positive mandatory injunction for complete restoration was requested by a foundation acting in the common interest. However, since the owner merely destroyed an already ruined building, the court held that the owner could only be held to restore the previous dilapidated and ruined state. Consequently, the injunction was rejected as being too broadly phrased. 80 This reveals a dichotomy. On the one hand, injunction is considered part of tort law as one remedy to vindicate rights and/or stop and prevent wrongdoing, while on the other hand it is thought to be a separate set of procedural tools incidentally touching but not necessarily connecting with substantive tort law.
§ 4. Towards a threefold taxonomy of risk-taking in tort
In this final section, I address the issue of the influence of a given legal system's perception of the functions of tort law on the relationship between tort and injunction. If a tort law system considers the claimant to have a right not to be subjected to the dangers caused by wrongful risk-taking, then injunction is a preemptive remedy sustaining that right. Logically speaking, this rights-based approach has much to commend it. When courts assess behaviour in a tort case and establish that the defendant was under a duty of care vis-à-vis the claimant for negligently failing to fulfil his duty and that the ensuing damage was in fact caused by wrongful risk-taking, then the behaviour is evaluated according to an ex tunc normative standard. Others have convincingly argued that it is logically impossible to state that someone's behaviour fell short of the behaviour that he could have been expected to display, without acknowledging that a certain standard of conduct applied at the moment of the act. 81 In other words: logic demands that duty precedes liability for wrongful risk-taking. It is not inconceivable, however, to conceptualize liability for risk-taking as not being preceded by a duty. To explore this possibility, which may enable us to better align tort law and injunction, we need to distinguish three forms of risk-taking in tort. 
Category 1
Firstly, there are injuries caused by risk-taking which are left uncompensated, for example, because the injured party is considered to be the unfortunate victim of 'daily' or 'ubiquitous' risks. In these cases, the loss remains where it falls and others are not considered to bear responsibility even though they may well be causally related (in part) to creating the risk. This is the case in certain nuisances that are considered 'bearable' or 'acceptable'.
Category 2
Secondly, there are those injuries which are compensated through the tort law system by assigning liability for the inherent but socially acceptable dangers of a certain activity. In such cases, the policy choice of a legislature or court to grant compensation, although the activity itself is deemed acceptable, may be based on the idea that the benefits of reducing the risk level by improving the care level do not outweigh the costs thereof, provided such improvement is possible at all. Compensation for the so-called 'residual losses' caused by this 'acceptable risk-taking' is then deemed appropriate. 83 What this entails, however, is that in principle injunction is denied.
Category 3
Thirdly, there are injuries which are compensated through the tort system because they were the result of wrongful risk-taking, such as the irresponsible omission to take precautionary measures by the person responsible for the source of danger, for example owners, users, or operators. This is the area where tort law compensates for reasons of negligence or wrongful infringement of protected interests. Such negligence or infringement constitutes unacceptable risk-taking, giving rise to both compensatory damages and injunctive relief.
In two specific cases, however, injunction may be denied. The first exception arises when the court, in weighing the interests of the claimant, defendant and other interests in light of a future remedy of compensation, finds that it would be unacceptably burdensome for the defendant to comply with the duty. The duty not to engage in unacceptable risk-taking may thus be converted into a category 2 case. The second exception arises when the court in weighing the interests of the claimant and the defendant, in light [31] of the availability of the retrospective remedy of compensation, finds that it would be unacceptably burdensome for the defendant to comply with a duty concerning a restorative injunction. 84 2 and 3 is the most relevant for our discussion. If in a specific case a court allows a claim for compensation but denies, ceteris paribus, the claim for injunction, then this may be a category 3 case. Therefore, it would be interesting to know how courts would react to the following two hypotheticals. The first hypothetical involves an employee who is continuously exposed to a noxious substance. On average, the substance is known to cause serious adverse health effects in 1% of the population of exposed employees. Before the danger materializes, the employee seeks prohibitory injunction. The second hypothetical involves school children running a 1 % risk while attending their school, of inhaling a fatal asbestos fiber and consequently developing mesothelioma after some 30 years. Assume that there is no public law regulation applicable in such as case. Would the court grant injunction petitioned by any of the children (or their legal representatives) ordering the school to remove the asbestos source or to provide an alternative school building?
It may be suggested that although no risk has yet materialised, French, German and English courts alike would grant injunctive relief nevertheless, even though the cases do not involve breach of statutory duties, but merely constitute a breach of uncodified duties of care not to take excessive risks concerning the health of others. Having said that, in view of the reported uncertainties surrounding injunctive relief, I am not entirely confident that injunction would be granted across the board. 85 If indeed an injunction were not to be granted while the court would award damages if -all other things being equal -the danger eventually materialized, then apparently the risk-taking as such is not 'wrongful' in the sense in which I have used that term here. In that case, the liability cannot be founded on the breach of a duty not to expose the claimant to the risk. In effect, the foundation of liability would be 'acceptable risk-taking, subject to an obligation to compensate the residual losses'.
